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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the remarkable economic and financial convergence over the last ten years in the 
euro area, mortgage interest rates still differ across countries. This note presents some stylised 
facts on the heterogeneity of mortgage interest rates across euro area countries on the basis of the 
Eurosystem’s harmonised MFI interest rate statistics. We also attempt to provide some insights 
into the reasons behind these cross-country differences using the methodology recently proposed 
by Affinito and Farabullini (2006). We differ from Affinito and Farabullini (2006) in that we 
focus on one particular banking market: the market for mortgage loans. This allows us to identify 
more clearly the role of specific structural features characterising that market in explaining 
mortgage rate dispersion. More specifically, we investigate the extent to which various mortgage 
loan demand and supply determinants help explaining the observed dispersion. It turns out that 
some of the heterogeneity can be explained by these factors, in particular those that relate to the 
supply side. However, a substantial part of the dispersion remains unexplained suggesting that 
much of the heterogeneity also reflects country-specific institutional differences that are likely to 
be caused by differences in the regulatory and fiscal framework of the mortgage markets. In order 
to test this, we extend our analysis to also include institutional factors and indeed find that cross-
country differences in enforcement procedures, tax subsidies and loan-to-value ratios influence 
the level of mortgage rates.  
 
JEL classification: C23, E4, F36, G21, N24   
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Despite the remarkable economic and financial convergence over the last ten years in the 
euro area, mortgage interest rates still differ across countries. This paper illustrates some of these 
differences and provides a few insights into why they arise. The analysis is useful not only to 
better understand the developments for the euro area as a whole, but also to assess financial 
market integration in general and the convergence in retail banking markets in particular. The 
mortgage market is of particular importance from the perspective of monetary policy as it plays 
an important role in the mechanism that transmits changes in the ECB’s key policy rates to 
housing investment and consumption by households, and ultimately to output and prices.  
As an analytical starting point, we review some recent studies that have examined the 
characteristics and integration of the European mortgage markets and related studies. Insights into 
the institutional differences across the European Union or across the euro area are provided by 
various reports of the European Commission and of the European Central Bank. At the national 
level, price dispersion has also been analysed using bank-level data in several euro area countries. 
A related strand of the literature focuses on the degree to which changes in market interest rates 
induce changes in the interest rates set by banks – the so-called interest-rate pass-through process 
– and the many factors that influence this process. 
Building on this latter strand of the literature, we apply the methodology recently proposed 
by Affinito and Farabullini (2006) to the mortgage market. This approach basically consists of 
computing tests of coefficient equality for pairs of estimated country dummies obtained from a 
regression first without and then with a set of control variables. These control variables comprise 
the factors that the economic literature typically identifies to determine bank interest rates in 
general and mortgage interest rates in particular. These include borrower-specific demand-side 
determinants (such as GDP growth, residential property prices and credit risk), lender-specific 
supply-side determinants (such as bank balance sheet characteristics, funding methods and 
competition) as well as other structural factors (such as country-specific institutional features 
reflecting the regulatory and fiscal framework). In contrast to Affinito and Farabullini (2006), by 
focusing on one particular banking market, namely the mortgage market, we are able to make a 
more precise identification of the cyclical, structural and institutional factors, which are likely to 
influence the price setting behaviour of banks in this market segment. We furthermore differ from 
Affinito and Farabullini (2006) in the sense that we control for differences in the initial period of 
interest rate fixation, we use longer time series and we include more explanatory variables, some 
of which pertain particularly to the mortgage loan demand and supply. 
The heterogeneity in mortgage interest rates across euro area countries is assessed on the 
basis of four instrument categories from the Eurosystem’s MFI interest rate statistics. The main 
advantage of this dataset is that the statistics are collected using a common framework, hence 
ensuring harmonised definitions and procedures, and resulting in a high degree of cross-country 
comparability. Also, the data measure interest rates on new mortgages so that the interest rates are 
contracted in the various countries at the same time.    
Our results suggest that much of the observed mortgage interest rate heterogeneity 
disappears once account is taken of differences in national demand and supply conditions. We 
find that differences in output growth, household debt and residential property prices affect 
mortgage interest rates, and that supply-side (lender-specific) factors appear to exert an even 
stronger influence. These latter factors include, in particular, bank liquidity as well as funding 
cost and practices. Although the evidence is relatively weak, our results also suggest that a lower 
concentration in the banking sector may have some tendency to exert a downward pressure on 
mortgage interest rates. Finally, our results indicate that part of the differences in observed 
mortgage interest rates may be due to measurement problems in the sense that the MFI interest 
5
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taking out a loan. 
At the same time, a significant part of the differences in mortgage rates across euro area 
countries cannot be explained by either conjunctural or structural factors. This may owe to the 
fact that some additional factors contributing to the observed heterogeneity reflect country-
specific institutional aspects - such as enforcement procedures, loan-to-value ratios and fiscal 
arrangements. In order to test this presumption, we extend the empirical analysis to also include 
such institutional factors. Our results suggest that country-specific institutional features, such as 
enforcement procedures, tax subsidies and loan-to-value ratios, indeed seem to influence the level 
of mortgage rates in addition to what can be explained by demand and supply factors. Moreover, 
it should be borne in mind that banking products to some extent are not easily comparable across 
the euro area countries, which therefore somewhat hampers a direct comparison of rates across 
countries. Such product heterogeneity may be caused by a lack of supply of some products in 
certain countries (which would not exist in an integrated banking market) and/or by a lack of 
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This paper analyses the cross-country heterogeneity of mortgage interest rates in the euro 
area. This analysis is useful not only to better understand the developments for the euro area as a 
whole, but also to assess convergence in retail banking markets. The mortgage market is of 
particular importance from the perspective of monetary policy as it plays an important role in the 
mechanism that transmits changes in the ECB’s policy rates to housing investment and 
consumption by households, and ultimately to output and prices.
3  
As a starting point, we present some stylised facts on the cross-country heterogeneity of 
mortgage interest rates in the euro area, which serve the purpose of illustrating that despite the 
considerable economic and financial convergence in the euro area over the last ten years, 
mortgage interest rates still differ across countries. 
As the monetary policy implications of a heterogeneous pass-through of policy rates to bank 
interest rates is likely to hinge on whether the heterogeneity is mainly driven by underlying 
economic factors or by institutional and product-related factors, we also attempt to provide some 
insights into the reasons behind these cross-country differences. We use the harmonised MFI 
interest rate statistics (MIR) and apply the methodology recently proposed by Affinito and 
Farabullini (2006) to the mortgage market. This approach basically consists of computing tests of 
coefficient equality for pairs of estimated country dummies obtained from a regression first 
without and then with a set of control variables. These control variables comprise the factors that 
the economic literature typically identifies to determine bank interest rates in general and 
mortgage interest rates in particular. These include borrower-specific demand-side determinants 
(such as GDP growth, residential property prices and credit risk), lender-specific supply-side 
determinants (such as bank balance sheet characteristics, funding methods and competition) as 
well as other structural factors (such as country-specific institutional features reflecting the 
regulatory and fiscal framework). We differ from Affinito and Farabullini (2006) by focusing on 
one particular banking market, namely the mortgage market. This enables us to identify more 
precisely the role of the various cyclical, structural and institutional factors pertaining directly to 
this market segment on banks’ pricing of mortgage loans. 
     We find that there are significant differences in the level of mortgage rates across the euro 
area countries. Our results furthermore suggest that this heterogeneity can partly be explained by 
conjunctural (demand-side) factors and to a larger extent by more structural (supply-side) factors. 
In particular, the explanatory power of structural factors may reflect a continued lack of 
integration of the euro area mortgage markets. That said, a significant part of the differences in 
mortgage rates across the euro area countries cannot be explained by either conjunctural or 
structural factors. This may suggest that banking products to some extent are not easily 
comparable across the euro area countries. Such product heterogeneity may be caused by a lack 
of supply of some products in certain countries (which would not exist in an integrated banking 
market) and/or by a lack of demand of some products in certain countries (owing to cultural or 
economic preferences). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
overview. Section 3 illustrates some of the country differences in mortgage interest rates. Section 
4 briefly describes the methodological approach to assess interest rate dispersion proposed by 
Affinito and Farabullini (2006), which we apply to the mortgage market. The results are 
presented in Section 5. Additional country-specific factors that are difficult to measure over time - 
                                                      
3   See also Issing (2005). 
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examined in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In recent years, a considerable number of studies have examined the characteristics and 
integration of the European mortgage markets. For example, Low et al. (2003) point to a number 
of shortcomings in terms of market completeness and efficiency, including price differentials, 
when comparing across European mortgage markets. Obstacles to the integration of European 
mortgage markets are also evidenced by Baele et al. (2004) and ECB (2005, 2006c), as well as by 
the European Commission (2005) Green Paper on “Mortgage credit in the EU” and London 
Economics (2005). More specifically, regarding cross-country differences in mortgage interest 
rates a recent report of the European Central Bank (ECB (2006b)) provided descriptive evidence 
of the degree of heterogeneity and its potential determinants.
4 This report underlines notable 
differences in the period of initial rate fixation, the existence of housing market schemes, the 
fiscal and regulatory framework, and collateral treatment as some of the main factors driving 
cross-country mortgage interest rate heterogeneity in the euro area.  
At the national level, Martin et al. (2005a) using a sample of Spanish banks and controlling 
for product differentiation point to the existence of price dispersion in retail banking markets due 
to information differentiation and borrower search costs. In a related study of the Dutch mortgage 
market, Hassink and Van Leuvensteijn (2006) provide evidence of price dispersion on mortgages 
even within lending banks’ loan portfolio. They relate this dispersion to the lack of market 
transparency owing to the presence of imperfect information and heterogeneous search costs. 
Affinito and Farabullini (2006) analyse the dispersion across euro area countries using the 
harmonised MFI interest rate statistics and find that the euro area banking markets are still highly 
segmented (and more so than within national borders). Moreover, they find that some of this 
dispersion may be explained by certain bank loan demand and supply factors. 
Related to studies of dispersion of mortgage interest rates and their determinants are studies 
examining the dynamic adjustment of mortgage interest rates (to changes in market interest rates) 
– i.e. the interest rate pass-through. For example, Mojon (2001) observes that the bank interest 
rate pass-through differs across euro area countries and relates this to differences in financial 
structure, including bank competition. In a somewhat related study, Kok Sørensen and Werner 
(2006) find a significant degree of heterogeneity in the bank interest rate pass-through across the 
euro area countries. Likewise, Gropp et al. (2007) find that differences in the pass-through of 
bank interest rates is significantly affected by the degree of competition from other banks as well 
as from financial markets and that this fact also result in asymmetric pricing behaviour over the 
interest rate cycle. In a study of the Dutch mortgage market using high-frequency bank-level data 
de Haan and Sterken (2005) likewise find asymmetric pricing behaviour, which to some extent 
seem to be due to bank market power. Moreover, Martin et al. (2005b) using a sample of Spanish 
bank-level data with which they are able to control for credit risk premia and product 
heterogeneity find in a test of the relative law of one price among similar bank products that price 
dispersion exists within the Spanish loan market. This dispersion seems especially to reflect bank-
specific effects owing to different credit policies, including relationship lending. In addition, they 
find that bank market power affects the speed of adjustment of bank interest rates to changes in 
market rates.  
                                                      
4   This report has been prepared by a group of experts at the ECB and at national central banks under the joint 
mandate of the Monetary Policy Committee and the Statistics Committee. 
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degree of mortgage interest rate cross-country heterogeneity and its determinants for the euro 
area. We differ from Affinito and Farabullini (2006) in the sense that we control for differences in 
initial rate fixation, use longer time series and we include more explanatory variables. With 
respect to the choice of determinants we select a number of variables that have been pointed out 
in the literature on bank interest margins
5, such as bank balance sheet and income statement 
characteristics as well as banking market structures (concentration). In addition, we include a 
number of variables that pertain particularly to the mortgage loan demand and supply.    
 
3. INTEREST RATE HETEROGENEITY - SOME STYLISED FACTS  
 
Harmonised MFI interest rate statistics have been published by the Eurosystem starting with 
the reference month January 2003. This dataset includes four broad instrument categories relating 
to MFI loans to households for house purchase. A detailed illustration of the cross-country 
differences in these interest rates is provided in ECB (2006b) and this section briefly highlight 
some main features starting with the levels and then turning to the changes. We use the interest 
rates on new business (rather than on outstanding amounts) because these rates have been 
contracted at the same time across the different countries.
6 
 
The degree of cross-country heterogeneity of the level of mortgage rates in the euro area and 
its development over time can be illustrated by the cross-country coefficient of variation. This is 
shown in Chart 1. According to that measure, the cross-country heterogeneity is non-negligible 
and moreover its development over time does not point to any significant reduction since January 
2003. Although the level dispersion for MFI interest rates on loans to households for house 
purchase is lower than in many other lending categories (especially in comparison with consumer 
credit), there are still some observable differences across the euro area. Based on US data from 
Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey, the dispersion of mortgage rates between US 












                                                      
5   See for example Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), and Maudos and Fernàndez de 
Guevara (2004).  
6   For ease of exposition, this paper uses the terms “loans to households for house purchase” and “mortgage loans” 
interchangeably, although from a methodological point of view there are a few differences.  
7   However, the US and euro area data are not strictly comparable, notably because the US data consider only five 
large regions (Northeast, Southeast, North Central, Southwest and West); some of the dispersion within those 
regions (i.e. across the US States) may thus not be captured. 
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Chart 1: Cross-country variation coefficients of the level of MFI interest rates on loans to 
households for house purchase (by period of initial rate fixation) 
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Note: figure for 2006 is the average for the period January 2006 to June 2006. 
 
An assessment of the degree of interest rate heterogeneity should also comprise cross-
country differences in the changes of MFI interest rates over time. This is of relevance from the 
perspective of the analysis of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in general and the 
degree to which changes in market interest rates are passed on to MFI interest rates in particular. 
Most factors that exert an influence on the levels are also likely to affect changes, although the 
latter may be expected to be somewhat less sensitive to country-specific factors.
8 
 
While this paper will not consider changes in more detail (due to the limited time period 
available in the MFI interest rate dataset), recent empirical evidence of cross-country 
heterogeneity in the bank interest rate pass-through has recently been reported by Kok Sørensen 
and Werner (2006).
9 Chart 2 illustrates the changes in MFI interest rates on mortgages, for 
example, in the segment “floating rate and up to 1 year initial rate fixation period” in comparison 
with the changes in market interest rates of a comparable maturity. The changes cover the period 
January 2003-September 2005 of declining interest rates and the period of increasing interest 
                                                      
8   Differences in the initial period of rate fixation, for example, lead to differences in the average level of the lending 
rate (through the yield curve) and to differences in the changes when the market interest rates of a duration 
comparable to the period of initial rate fixation follow different developments. In contrast, factors like a cap on the 
variability of interest rates may exert a stronger and more direct influence on changes than on the average level of 
the interest rate. 
9   The authors chain link the MFI interest rate dataset with its predecessor – the retail interest rate dataset – in order to 
obtain a longer historical time series. 
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countries appear to broadly follow the direction of changes in corresponding market rates, in both 
periods there are marked differences regarding the size of the changes across countries as well as 
across instrument categories. These latest developments tend to suggest that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the pass-through of changes in market rates to mortgage interest rates across the 
euro area countries.  
 
Chart 2: Change in MFI interest rates on loans to households for house purchase at floating 
rate and up to 1 year initial rate fixation period 








BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
Jan 2003-Sep 2005
Oct 2005-Jun 2006
Change 3-month Euribor Jan 2003-Sep 2005
Change 3-month Euribor Oct 2005-Jun 2006
Source: ECB. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
This section briefly describes the methodological approach to assess dispersion in MFI 
interest rates proposed by Affinito and Farabullini (2006), which we apply to the mortgage 
market in the euro area. This approach – summarised in section 4.1 - basically consists of 
computing pairwise tests of equality of coefficients obtained from a regression first only on 
country dummies and then in a separate step from a regression that also includes control variables 
that are usually taken to affect bank interest rates. These control variables (or determinants) are 
described in section 4.2.  
 
4.1. The empirical specification    
 
Recent empirical studies have examined the determinants underlying the heterogeneity in 
bank interest rates across euro area countries. For example, focusing on the level differences, 
Affinito and Farabullini (2006) provide a first empirical analysis of cross-country differences 
using only the harmonised MFI interest rate dataset. They carry out tests of equality of 
11
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any explanatory factors, and in a second step add to that regression determinants that control for 
various demand and supply-side characteristics. The comparison of the coefficient equality tests 
resulting from the regression without control variables and from the regression with control 
variables provides some indication of whether the observed heterogeneity in MFI interest rates 
disappears once differences in national demand and supply conditions are taken into account.  
Thus, in the first step we estimate the following equation for the four instrument categories 
in as many regressions: 
 
it it i it t it C T r ε β α + + =
' '  [1] 
 
where rit is the interest rate for a given instrument category for country i in month t. The number 
of countries is i=1, 2, …, N with N=12. The number of monthly observations for each country is 
t=1, 2, …, M with M=40 (corresponding to January 2003 to April 2006). The total number of 
observations therefore amounts to 480 (N*M). Tit is an (NM*M) matrix of monthly time dummies 
and Cit is an (NM*N) matrix of binary country dummies. The error term is denoted εit. 
The estimated coefficients on the country dummies, βi, are used for the statistical Wald tests 
of the significance of bilateral differences for each pair of countries (i, j): 
H0: βi = βj        i ≠ j [1a] 
on the basis of the F[1,NM-k] statistic, where k is the number of regressors, which in this first step 
regression is equal to (k=N+M-1). When the null hypothesis of coefficient equality can not be 
rejected (at the 5% significance level), the bilateral difference between two national interest rates 
is considered to be insignificant, suggesting that the interest rates for that particular pair of 
countries are broadly at the same level.   
In the second step, equation [1] is progressively augmented by including first demand-side 
regressors (Xit) and subsequently supply-side regressors (Zit):  
 
it it h it g it i it t it Z X C T r ε δ γ β α + + + + =
' ' ' '  [2] 
 
The Wald tests of the significance of bilateral differences for each pair of countries are then 
computed as in the case of the first step regression.  
Finally, to test for the possible impact of country-specific institutional features that are less 
likely to change frequently over time (and typically are only available at low data frequencies), 
we extend the empirical method in the following way.
10 First, we assume that the institutional 
features should be expected to influence all four types of mortgage rates in more or less the same 
way. Hence, we carry out a pooled regression including all four types of mortgage rates. Second, 
                                                      
10   In conceptual terms, this extension is similar to the approach used by Gropp et al (2007) to estimate the impact of 
structural factors that are difficult to measure over time. An alternative would have been to specify a cross-sectional 
regression using averages over the entire sample period and pooling the rates for different interest fixation periods, 
but due to the still limited number of observations available, this alternative approach would not have enabled us to 
control for the demand and supply variables at the same time.     
12
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observation per country, we split the country dummies in equation [2] into two groups with 
“high” respectively “low” indicator values. Third, we conduct Wald tests of the significance of 
differences in “high” country dummies and the “low” country dummies.  
Thus, in the “institutional” version of the model we estimate the following equation: 
 
it it h it g lot lo hit hi it t it Z X C C T r ε δ γ β β α + + + + + =
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '  [3] 
 
where rit is the pooled interest rate for country i in month t. Chit and Clot refer to the “high” 
country dummies and the “low” country dummies, respectively. Equation [3] is estimated with 
respect to each of the specific institutional factors.  
  
4.2. Determinants of mortgage interest rates    
 
This section summarises the most important determinants of bank interest rates that have 
been suggested in the literature.
11 We use these determinants as factors that are likely to explain 
cross-country differences, and classify them into two groups: (i) demand-side determinants 
comprise factors that are largely related to the characteristics of the borrower (such as the demand 
for credit, the evolution of housing markets and the creditworthiness of the borrower); and (ii) 
supply-side determinants comprise factors that are largely related to the characteristics of the 
banking system (such as bank balance sheets, funding methods and competition). While not 
always unambiguous, we nevertheless seek to make a distinction between demand-side and 
supply-side determinants in an attempt to provide some indication of whether the reasons 
underlying mortgage interest rate heterogeneity are of a cyclical nature (reflecting differences in 
national demand conditions), or of a structural nature, reflecting differences in national supply 
conditions.  
In addition to demand-side and supply-side determinants, we also include one factor that 
controls for measurement issues in the MFI interest rates.  
Table 1 and Chart 3 provide an overview of the determinants of mortgage interest rates that 
will be described in what follows, together with the expected impact on the interest rates and 
summary statistics. In selecting these determinants, we have focused on those where cross-
country differences are relatively pronounced thereby having the largest potential in explaining 
interest rate heterogeneity. For example, we do not consider the effect of interest rate risk in the 
loan premium given that money market volatility is uniform across euro area countries during the 
period considered. 
                                                      
11   For recent reviews, see for example, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) or Gropp et al. (2007) and 
references therein.  
13
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of the household sector. A higher demand for housing may in turn lead to a higher demand for 
mortgage credit, given that most households require external financing to purchase a dwelling. 
Data on households’ disposable income for individual euro area countries are, however, only 
available at annual frequency, so that we take gross domestic product as a proxy for household 
income.
12 A positive relation between GDP and mortgage rates may also be expected a priori 
because market interest rates tend to be pro-cyclical in the sense that money market rates rise 
when the economy is growing rapidly.
13 Moreover, we use GDP growth in nominal terms in order 
to disentangle the effects of house price dynamics, which we measure by the annual growth rate 
in nominal residential property prices. Developments in house prices are particularly important 
for mortgage loans given that they are usually secured by the dwelling that the borrower is 
acquiring. Changes in house prices affect the value of the collateral. The quality of collateral, 
together with the economic prospects of the borrower, determines the credit risk premium in the 
loan spread. We expect that higher growth in residential property prices leads to a higher value of 
the collateral thereby to lower credit risk for the bank and lower interest rates.
14 At the same time, 
by increasing demand for mortgage loans higher property prices may also exert a positive impact 
on mortgage rates. Hence, a priori the overall effect of residential property prices on mortgage 
rates is ambiguous. With regard to the overall creditworthiness of the borrower we include the 
ratio of household debt per capita (due to the lack of a more direct measure) and generally 
expect a positive relationship with the level of mortgage rates.
15  
 
Supply-side (bank-related) variables 
 
Liquidity risk is the risk of not having sufficient cash or borrowing capacity to meet deposit 
withdrawals or new loan demand, thereby forcing banks to borrow emergency funds at potentially 
higher cost (Angbazo (1997)). As the proportion of funds invested in cash or cash equivalents 
increases, the liquidity risk of the bank declines, which may reduce the liquidity premium in bank 
spreads. Similarly, by introducing liquidity risk into the Monti-Klein model of the banking firm 
(Klein (1971), Monti (1972)) in the form of some randomness in the volume of loans or deposits, 
Prisman et al. (1986) show that the cost of the bank’s resources should increase, as it includes a 
premium to compensate for the expected cost of a liquidity shortage (see also Freixas and Rochet 
(1997)). We measure liquidity risk by the ratio of cash and debt securities held divided by short-
term deposits and expect a negative relation with the interest rate level.  
The level of bank capital may also affect the price-setting behaviour of banks in several 
ways. First, banks hold capital to insulate themselves against both expected and unexpected credit 
risk (Saunders and Schumacher (2000)). While capital requirements constitute the minimum 
level, banks often endogenously choose to hold more capital against unexpected credit losses or 
market discipline may induce them to hold more capital (Flannery and Rangan (2004)). However, 
holding equity capital is a more expensive funding source than debt (because of tax and dilution 
                                                      
12   We do not use the nominal growth rate of MFI loans to households for house purchase as a measure for demand to 
avoid endogeneity.  
13   The period considered covers the single monetary policy so that the market interest rates in the euro area countries 
are the same. 
14   House price growth affects the value of collateral for existing mortgages, but not necessarily for new mortgages. 
Hence, there is not necessarily a negative relation between house prices and mortgage rates.   
15   In periods of credit rationing this relationship may, however, turn negative to the extent that banks regulate supply 
through volumes rather than through prices. 
14
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Demand-side (borrower-related) variables 
 of control reasons). Thus, banks that have a relatively high capital ratio for regulatory or credit 
policy reasons can be expected to seek to cover some of the increase in the average cost of capital 
by operating with higher interest rate spreads. Second, since capital is considered to be the most 
expensive form of liabilities, holding capital above the regulatory minimum is a credible signal of 
creditworthiness on the part of the bank (Claeys and Vander Vennet (2003)).
16 We measure bank 
capital by the ratio of capital and reserves divided by total liabilities. The relationship with the 
interest rate level is expected to be ambiguous.  
A market-based measure of the banks’ soundness is the so-called expected default 
frequency (EDF) of banks, which is derived on a monthly basis by Moody’s KMV’s Credit 
Monitor model. It expresses the bank’s probability of default over the next twelve months and is 
mainly related to the banks’ balance sheet situation. The EDF rests upon the assumption that a 
bank goes bankrupt and defaults when its liabilities exceed its value (as calculated by the market 
value of its outstanding shares).
17 Thus, a higher EDF would indicate deteriorating bank 
soundness and hence should be positively related with the bank lending rate as banks may try to 
compensate for this weakness by widening their margins.  
Stronger competition among banks should lead to a more efficient pricing and thereby lead 
to a lower mortgage rate. However, competition is typically difficult to measure. Two measures 
are available as a time series at quarterly frequency: the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl 
index.
18 We choose the latter because, unlike the market share of the five or ten largest banks, the 
Herfindahl index will reflect changes in the market structure also among smaller banks. We 
expect a positive relationship between this measure and the level of mortgage interest rates.  
We include the interest rate on deposits from households as a measure of the banks’ 
funding costs with regard to core deposits. We expect a positive relationship with mortgage 
interest rates, as higher funding costs should translate into higher loan rates. The extent to which 
banks take recourse to market-based funding may, on the one hand, exert a negative pressure on 
bank loan rates as banks that are less able to rely on a stable pool of traditional deposits have 
correspondingly lower market power when pricing their loans. This effect may be particularly 
strong for mortgage loans with floating rate and short-term rate fixation due to the relatively 
larger interest risk (compared to long-term fixed-rate loans). On the other hand, since market-
based funding is more expensive and risky (in terms of refinancing) than traditional deposit 
funding banks may compensate by engaging in more expensive loan pricing. Moreover, loan 
securitisation enables mortgage lenders to remove risk from their balance sheet so that the extent 
of securitisation may affect loan supply and lending rates. We expect a negative relationship 
between the degree of securitisation and mortgage interest rates, as the securitised assets should 
augment loan supply and hence lower loan rates. 
                                                      
16   Alternatively, holding excess capital may signal a stronger incentive for banks to efficiently monitor their 
borrowers (in a situation of scarce supply of high quality borrowers), e.g. Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2005). 
17    The derivation of the EDFs thereby assumes that it is the same factors which affect the share price and the 
probability of default. This is a rather strong assumption since it may be expected that a large number of factors 
(besides the probability of default) influence share prices. 
18   These two traditional measures of competition are not uncontested in the literature and alternatives such as the 
Lerner index, the H-statistic or the Boone indicator may provide additional or more valuable information on the 
degree of competition in the market. For most of the euro area countries these measures are, however, not available 
as time series. Hence, it would require a different modelling set-up to take into account the effect of competition on 
mortgage rates according to these more direct measures of bank competition.       
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MFI interest rates only measure the interest rate component of the cost to mortgage 
borrowers. Banks may charge lower interest rates but at the same time demand higher non-
interest rate charges (fees and commissions) so that we could expect a negative relation between 
mortgage rates and non-interest income. We measure the latter by the difference in basis points 
between the annual percentage rate of charge (APRC) and the MFI interest rate on new business 
(for all periods of initial rate fixation combined).
19 Furthermore, in some cases banks may (for 
example due to competitive pressures) choose to keep mortgage interest rates constant even if 
market rates change and instead alter the maturity structure of the loans offered. We would 
generally expect a negative relationship, as for example in a situation of increasing market rates 




Table 1: Determinants of mortgage rates and descriptive statistics 
Variable (expected sign in 
brackets)
Description mean s.d. min max n
Nominal gross domestic 
product (+)
Annual percentage changes; source: Eurostat.  2.44 1.83 -2.19 7.99 480
Residential property prices (-) Annual percentage changes; source: national sources. 7.86 5.98 -7.74 18.75 480
Household debt per capita (+) Total outstanding MFI loans divided by total population; 
source: ECB and Eurostat.
10.72 3.98 4.86 28.41 480
Bank capital (+/-) Capital and reserves as a ratio of total liabilities; source: 
ECB.
0.06 0.02 0.03 0.10 480
Bank liquidity (-) Cash and debt securities held by MFIs as a ratio of short-
term deposits; source: ECB.
0.89 0.55 0.17 2.17 480
Bank’s expected default 
frequency (+)
Expected probability of default one year ahead; source: 
Moody's KMV.
0.24 0.35 0.00 3.44 480
Market-based funding (+/-) Debt securities with an original maturity over 1 year issued 
by MFIs as a ratio of non-MFI deposits; source: ECB.  
0.30 0.20 0.00 0.70 480
Competition (+) Herfindahl index; source: ECB. 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.27 480
Non-interest charges (-) Difference in basis points between the annual percentage 
rate of change and the MFI interest rate (all periods of 
initial rate fixation combined); source: ECB. 
0.27 0.26 -0.02 1.01 480
Deposit funding (+) Bank interest rate on deposits from households (excluding 
overdrafts; new business weights); source: ECB.
1.84 0.57 0.45 3.04 480
Maturity structure (-) The share of mortgage loans with original maturity over 5 
years to total mortgage loans (outstanding amounts); 
source: ECB.
0.96 0.04 0.84 0.99 480
Securitisation (-) Securitised issues placed in Europe as fraction of GDP (by 
country of collateral; excluding Pfandbriefe); source: 
European Securitisation Forum.
1.84 2.11 0.00 8.04 480
 
 
                                                      
19   This calculation implicitly assumes identical non-interest charges across the different fixation bands. 
20    For example, in Belgium, the so-called “accordion option” on floating-rate mortgages gives the borrower the 
opportunity on the interest rate reset date to choose between adjusting the amortization or adjusting the duration of 
the loan while keeping the present amortization, without exceeding a total duration of 30 years (see also Banque 
Nationale de Belgique (2006)). 
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Measurement issues   
Chart 3: Explanatory variables 
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Sources: ECB, Eurostat, European Securitisation Forum, Moody’s KMV and national sources. 
 
5. RESULTS 
Equations [1] and [2] have been estimated by ordinary least squares. The main results of the 
subsequent Wald tests of coefficient equality are summarised in Chart 4 for each of the four 
instrument categories.
21 As can be seen, the percentage of statistically similar bilateral differences 
tends to increase as demand-side and supply-side determinants are added to the regression. This 
suggests that the observed interest rate dispersion is considerably reduced once account is taken 
of the different demand and supply conditions in the mortgage markets across euro area countries.  
 









floating and up to 1 year over 1 and up to 5 years over 5 and up to 10 years over 10 years
country and time dummies only
plus demand-side regressors
plus demand and supply-side regressors
 
A closer look at the estimation results concerning the control variables, reported in Table 2, 
provide some further indication about the forces at work and the reasons for the cross-country 
differences in the mortgage rates. Starting with the demand-side determinants, we find that 
                                                      
21   The full results are reported in the Table of the annex.  
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sign and significantly so in the case of “floating and up to 1 year” – and also in the case of “over 
10 years” when supply-side variables are added. Residential property price growth is found to 
exert a negative influence on mortgage rates but is only significant in the category “floating and 
up to 1 year”. This may partly reflect that the countries with strong house price dynamics are also 
those where mortgages are granted at a variable rate. When supply-side variables are added 
differences in house price developments also affect longer term rates (“over 5 and up to 10 
years”) – though in a positive way. Household debt per capita, as expected, is significantly and 
positively related to mortgage rates at “floating and up to 1 year” and “over 1 and up to 5 years”. 
This may reflect that credit risk considerations are more of an issue with respect to loans as short-
term fixation where interest rate risk, and hence repayment risk, is more pronounced. This may 
suggest that over the period considered banks have tended to charge a credit risk premium by 
raising interest rates when household indebtedness increased. 
With respect to the supply-side determinants, bank liquidity exhibits the expected negative 
sign in all but one regressions and turns out strongly significant in the categories “floating and up 
to 1 year” and “over 5 and up to 10 years”. In contrast, according to our model specification, bank 
capital does not seem to have a significant effect on mortgage rates. The result for the bank EDFs 
is somewhat mixed. While we do find the expected positive sign in the case of “over 1 and up to 5 
years” and “over 5 and up to 10 years”, the sign is significantly negative for  “floating and up to 
one year”.  
Deposit funding costs are found to exert the expected (and significant) positive influence on 
mortgage interest rates – in the categories “over 1 and up to 5 years” and “over 10 years”. The 
effect of market-based funding is negative in the cases of “floating and up to 1 year” and “over 1 
and up to 5 years” and positive in the two long-term instrument categories: “over 5 and up to 10 
years” and “over 10 years”. These results are in line with the ambiguous theoretical predictions. 
At the same time, the estimated coefficient is significant for all four instrument categories, so that 
it does appear that cross-country differences in mortgage funding practices matter. The results 
regarding securitisation are less convincing, although we do find a weakly significant (expected) 
negative effect in the case of “over 5 and up to 10 years”. 
The Herfindahl index exerts a positive effect on interest rates in all four regressions. 
Although the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels, this result may nevertheless 
suggest that a lower concentration in the banking sector may have a tendency to exert a 
downward pressure on mortgage rates.






                                                      
22   As a cross-check, we also investigated the effect of competition using the results of the Eurosystem’s bank lending 
survey in which banks report the extent to which competition from “other banks” or “non-banks” affect bank credit 
standards on mortgage loans. The results were similar to those found applying the more traditional concentration 
index. Also competition from non-banks seems to exert an influence. Although useful as a cross-check, 
interpretations of the competition indicator derived from the bank lending survey should be taken with a note of 
caution for two main reasons. First, this indicator is not a direct measure of competition but simply one of several 
contributing factors affecting changes in credit standards from one quarter to the next. Second, the BLS indicator is 
qualitative and reflects the banks (or more precisely the senior loan officers) perception of their present situation. 
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Table 2: Coefficient estimates 
floating 
and up to 
1 year
over 1 and 
up to 5 
years
over 5 and 





and up to 
1 year
over 1 
and up to 
5 years
over 5 




Nominal GDP growth 0.02 ** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 *** 0.01 0.04 0.04 *
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Residential property prices growth -0.02 *** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 *** -0.01 0.03 ** 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Household debt per capita 0.01 * 0.05 * 0.04 -0.01 0.02 *** 0.09 ** -0.01 -0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Bank capital -1.17 7.90 0.33 7.59
(1.90) (9.58) (9.48) (6.98)
Liquidity -0.31 *** -0.34 -3.29 *** 0.82 *
(0.12) (0.62) (0.61) (0.45)
Expected default frequency -0.07 *** 0.07 0.16 -0.11
(0.03) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10)
Bonds/deposits -0.51 ** -4.27 *** 9.52 *** 2.49 **
(0.27) (1.40) (1.39) (1.03)
Herfindahl index 2.02 7.49 2.28 5.05
(1.32) (6.75) (6.63) (4.87)
Non-interest charges -0.14 * -0.21 -0.71 * -0.88 ***
(0.08) (0.43) (0.41) (0.29)
Deposit funding costs 0.01 0.32 ** -0.02 0.28 ***
(0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10)
Maturity structure 0.02 3.96 -11.94 *** -4.73 **
(0.63) (3.17) (3.13) (2.30)
Securitisation -0.01 0.16 -0.18 * 0.09
(0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
R-squared 0.999 0.985 0.989 0.992 0.999 0.986 0.991 0.993
Demand Demand and Supply
 
Note: Equations were estimated using ordinary-least squares; standard errors in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; country and time dummies are not reported. 
 
Fees exhibit the expected negative sign in all four regressions and significantly so in the 
categories “floating and up to 1 year”, “over 5 and up to 10 years” and “over 10 years”. These 
results seem to indicate that part of the cross-country heterogeneity may be due to measurement 
issues in the sense that the MFI interest rate statistics do not include fees and other non-interest 
related costs that households incur when taking out a loan. Finally, differences in maturity 
structure seem to exert a significant (and expected) negative influence on mortgage interest rates 
for the “over 5 and up to 10 years” and “over 10 years” categories. That is, the loan categories 
where changes in maturity may be expected to matter most in terms of the overall borrowing 
costs.  
 
6. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
All in all, the econometric results provide some insights into why mortgage interest rates 
differ across countries, yet a good deal of this heterogeneity remains unexplained, suggesting that 
other country-specific factors such as institutional differences that are difficult to measure over 
time play an important role. Commonly cited examples include inter alia differences in 
enforcement procedures, loan-to-value ratios and fiscal systems (e.g. Low et al (2003), London 
Economics (2005), European Central Bank (2006b)). 
Enforcement procedure. The expected cost of anticipated losses depends not only on the 
probability of the default but also on the cost of the event itself. While the probability of default is 
influenced by many factors (position in the business cycle, income prospects, etc.), the cost of the 
event itself is also determined by the national legal framework and, in particular, by the cost and 
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spent) are borne by the creditor, banks may include them ex ante into their lending rates. As the 
cost and duration of collateral enforcement varies considerably across countries (see Chart 5), it 
cannot be excluded that these differences also exert an influence on MFI interest rates.  
Loan-to-value ratios. The credit risk premium also depends on the value of the collateral 
provided by the borrower in relation to the value of the loan. Chart 6 illustrates the large 
differences in the “average” loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. These LTV ratios in some of the largest 
euro area countries where mortgage loans are offered predominantly at variable rate are generally 
somewhat lower. It has been argued, for example, that the low LTV ratio in Italy (55%) reflects 
the difficulty for the lender to enforce repossession in case of default of the borrower due to slow 
and costly judicial proceedings (e.g. MacLennan et al (1998) and Ahearne et al (2005)).
23  
Fiscal factors are measured by the tax wedge computed by van den Noord (2003). The 
wedge measures the difference between after-tax and pre-tax mortgage interest rates, taking into 
account deductibility of mortgage interest payments from taxable income, tax credits, and 
taxation of imputed income from owner-occupied housing (Chart 7). A negative tax wedge 
indicates that the tax system provides a subsidy (see also Wolswijk (2005)). While the tax wedges 
are calculated on tax parameters prevailing in 1999, they may nevertheless provide a broad cross-
country indication of tax incentives for house ownership.
24 
 
Chart 5: “Typical” duration of enforcement 
procedure (in months) 




























Source: European Mortgage Federation (2002), national 
sources. 
Note: The horizontal line is the euro area average.  
Source: Low et al. (2003), London Economics (2005) 




                                                      
23   The simple correlation coefficient between the duration of the enforcement procedure (in Chart 5) and the average 
LTV ratio (in Chart 6) is indeed negative (ρ=-0.40).  
24   The highly negative tax wedge in the NL reflects that interest expenses are fully deductible against total income. 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that the Nationale Hypotheek Garantie (NHG) - which is a government fund - 
guarantees loan for the purchase and/or refurbishment of a dwelling up to a certain amount.   
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Source: Van den Noord (2003). 
Note: A low value indicates a high degree of tax subsidies. The 
value of the tax wedge for BE, DE and FR is neutral 
(amounting to nil). The horizontal line is the euro area average. 
 
In order to provide some insight into the possible effects of these institutional factors, we 
estimate equation [3] separately for country-specific enforcement procedures, taxation and LTV 
ratios, respectively. The results are reported in Table 3 and suggest that differences in the 
institutional set-up across national mortgage markets do have an effect on national mortgage 
rates. First, banks seem to compensate longer (and more costly) enforcement procedures by 
demanding higher mortgage rates. Second, mortgage rates are found to be lower in countries 
where the tax system contains generous incentives for house ownership. The lower mortgage 
rates in these countries may reflect the perceived lower credit risk in light of the explicit, or 
implicit, government involvement in the housing market. Third, as expected, a higher LTV ratio 
is found to imply higher mortgage rates possibly reflecting the larger degree of credit risk.
25 
Finally, we conducted Wald tests of parameter equality between the “high” and “low” indicator 
values and found that the differences between the two groups were statistically significant in all 
cases.   
 
Table 3. The effect of institutional factors 
  Enforcement procedure  Tax wedge  LTV ratio (average) 
 high  low  ratio  high  low  ratio  high  low  ratio 
rit 9.37  8.73  7.25% 7.86 6.99 12.39% 9.24  8.71  6.05%
Wald test  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Note: The figures in the “high” and “low” columns refer to the parameter estimates on the two groups of country 
dummies. “Ratio” indicates the ratio of “high” to “low” parameter estimates (in percentages). A “high” tax wedge 
indicates a low degree of subsidies. “Wald test” indicates the p-value of the Wald tests of parameter equality. The 
parameter estimates for time dummies and control variables are not shown. 
                                                      
25   We estimated the effect on mortgage rates of both average LTV ratios and maximum LTV ratios (not shown in 
Table 3) and found similar results.  
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February 20077. CONCLUSION 
A simple analysis of the harmonised MFI interest rate statistics published by the Eurosystem 
suggests that mortgage rates are rather heterogeneous across euro area countries, both in terms of 
levels and changes. Part of these differences may be due to measurement problems in the sense 
that the MFI interest rate statistics do not include fees and other non-interest related costs that 
households incur when taking out a loan. As a result, we are able only to measure a part (the 
interest rate component) of the elements constituting the pricing of loans. This notwithstanding, 
by applying the methodology proposed by Affinito and Farabullini (2006) to the mortgage 
market, we find that some of the observed mortgage rate heterogeneity disappears once account is 
taken of differences in national demand and supply conditions. Moreover, supply-side factors 
appear to exert a more significant influence. At the same time, a considerable part of the 
heterogeneity remains unexplained by the demand and supply conditions. Hence, we test and find 
that additional country-specific institutional aspects (such as enforcement procedures, loan-to-
value ratios and fiscal arrangements) also contribute to the observed heterogeneity. All in all, by 
applying the Affinito-Farabullini approach to explaining interest rate dispersion to one specific 
banking market, namely the market for mortgage loans, we are able to make a clearer 
identification of the role of the various factors determining banks’ pricing behaviour in this 
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Table: Significance of bilateral differences 
(p-values greater than 0.05; the row “count” reports for each country the total number of cases where the p-value is 
greater than 0.05 (horizontally and vertically)) 
(i) floating and up to 1 year  
(a) only time and country dummies
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 . 0.00
FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
C o u n t 201012111120
(b) plus demand-side regressors
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 . 0.00
FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
C o u n t 100203001030
(c) plus demand-side and supply-side regressors
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.98 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.72 0.00 0.02 0.63 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.08 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.20 0.02 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.05 0.00 0.60 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.72 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.01 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.14 0.18 0.00 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.62 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 . 0.00
FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 .
C o u n t 504334551440  
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(ii) over 1 and up to 5 years 
(a) only time and country dummies
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.21 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.11 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.21 0.74 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.01 0.18 0.10 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.55 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.34 0.00 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00
FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.09 0.93 0.67 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.00 .
C o u n t 320555553205
(b) plus demand-side regressors
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.60 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.01 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.28 0.07 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.28 0.10 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.81 0.01 0.38 0.02 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.10 0.00 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00
FI 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.51 0.10 0.74 0.09 0.73 0.00 0.00 .
C o u n t 120545653306
(c) plus demand-side and supply-side regressors
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.03 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.11 0.17 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.91 0.01 0.05 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.35 0.02 0.74 0.44 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.93 0.00 0.21 0.96 0.20 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.06 0.52 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.01 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.51 0.00 0.59 0.44 0.73 0.21 0.03 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.48 0.01 0.00 0.45 0.25 0.60 0.01 0.31 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.21 0.02 0.80 0.09 0.53 0.04 0.03 0.30 0.07 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.07 0.44 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.11 0.52 0.36 0.00 0.77 . 0.00
FI 0.58 0.07 0.07 0.65 0.41 0.71 0.07 0.48 0.92 0.21 0.03 .
C o u n t 1 0497 1 0869788 1 0  
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(iii) over 5 and up to 10 years 
(a) only time and country dummies
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.01 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.00 0.00 0.01 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.15 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.23 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.41 0.00 0.04 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00
FI 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
C o u n t 140014404301
(b) plus demand-side regressors
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.45 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.00 0.00 0.28 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.89 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.22 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.06 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.72 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.95 0.03 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.56 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.54 0.40 0.00 0.18 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00
FI 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.53 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.00 .
C o u n t 651137406605
(c) plus demand-side and supply-side regressors
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.98 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.95 0.00 0.88 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.69 0.00 0.71 0.75 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.34 0.00 0.33 0.14 0.04 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.47 0.00 0.43 0.29 0.01 0.78 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.13 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00
FI 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.20 0.00 .
C o u n t 525546264216  
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(iv) over 10 years 
(a) only time and country dummies
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.03 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.38 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.00 0.13 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.00 0.20 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.83 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.01 0.52 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.55 . 0.00
FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
C o u n t 044111215542
(b) plus demand-side regressors
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.28 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.22 0.86 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.42 0.24 0.23 0.00 0.57 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.01 0.18 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.03 0.28 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.69 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.09 0.45 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.44 0.61 . 0.00
FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
C o u n t 467115315562
(c) plus demand-side and supply-side regressors
BE DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
BE . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.78 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR 0.00 0.12 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ES 0.69 0.95 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR 0.74 0.43 0.02 0.47 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IE 0.86 0.81 0.03 0.71 0.45 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.36 0.14 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.23 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LU 0.68 0.89 0.06 0.98 0.10 0.60 0.36 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.15 0.68 0.02 0.49 0.29 0.44 0.77 0.68 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
AT 0.40 0.28 0.21 0.48 0.18 0.23 0.64 0.45 0.93 . 0.00 0.00
PT 0.06 0.27 0.58 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.54 0.23 0.06 0.44 . 0.00
FI 0.43 0.57 0.00 0.41 0.81 0.58 0.25 0.50 0.07 0.28 0.02 .
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